Consider the classic single-server first-come-first-served M/G/1 queue with the exception that service demand distribution is determined endogenously by the following mechanism: Each customer who starts getting service decides when to stop and then leaves the system for good. In addition, all customers have linear costs (with random slopes) in their waiting times (not including service times) and each of them continuously observes her marginal utility from service duration. It is assumed that the marginal utilities of the customers are general iid nonincreasing, right-continuous stochastic processes which are independent from the arrival process. With these assumptions an individual optimization may cause an overuse of the server. To overcome this inefficiency, we suggest a methodology to compute a price function which implements a socially optimal resource allocation. It is shown that this function internalizes the tangible externalities created by customers. Furthermore, similar results are derived for M/G/1 retrial queue and consequently we make a conjecture regarding the expression for the expected tangible externalities in such a system. Finally, these results are illustrated with some examples of nonincreasing, right-continuous stochastic processes.
Introduction
Consider a single-server queue with a Poisson stream of customers such that there are no abandonments and all customers join the queue. The service discipline is strong, non-preemptive and work conserving (for exact definitions see e.g., Section 1 of [15] ). In addition, any customer who gets service decides when to stop and then leaves the system for good. Examples for real-life situations in which customers decide when to end their service consider clients in a coffee-shop, cars in a parking garage and etc. The decision of the customers is influenced by three factors: (1) They all have (random) linear costs in their waiting times (not including service times). (2) Their marginal utilities are general iid nonincreasing right-continuous stochastic processes which are independent from the arrival process. 1 (3) There is a deterministic price function which states a payment for every service duration. In addition, each customer continuously observes the evolution of hers marginal utility over time. Then, since there is no an option that a customer effects her waiting time by doing some action, then for every customer, the individual optimization is focused on the question of when to quit the service position? This problem is an optimal-stopping problem with respect to the natural filtration which is associated with the customer's marginal utility process. Thus, since the marginal utilities of the customers are iid processes which are independent from the arrival process, so is the resulting service demands. Thus, the resulting queue is a regular M/G/1 queue with a service distribution which is determined endogenously by the above-mentioned mechanism and especially by the choice of a price function.
This setup motivates the following question: Is it possible to choose a price function for which the performance of the system is optimized from a social point of view? This work includes an analysis with a positive answer to this question when the performance measure is the expected total utility of a random customer in the steady state of the resulting M/G/1 queue. In particular, we suggest a methodology to compute a price function which leads to optimal performance of the system with respect to this criterion by a two-phase method. Importantly, in this paper we assume that this price function is a deterministic function of the service duration. Note that such a price function is not optimal among all pricing rules since it ignores all aspects of the system except service duration. For example, it is better to implement a price function which allows a customer to get service for free once there are no waiting customers. However, as mentioned by [15] , there are some arguments for a price function which is uniquely determined by service duration:
1. In some occasions monitoring the queue length is not possible due to technical reasons. Also, it is possible that such monitoring is too expensive.
2. It might be a bit unfair to require different payments from customers having the same service duration. For instance, a customer may refuse to pay large amounts of money due to a batch of arrivals happened just after she had started receiving service claiming that it is not her fault.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 includes the model description. Section 3 includes an explanation about how a socially optimal price function can be derived by using a two-phase method. Section 4 contains some applications of the results of Section 3 to special cases. Section 5 starts by a brief review regarding the notion of tangible externalities in the sense of [15] . Then, the main result of this section relates between the price function described in Section 3 and this notion. Section 6 includes a model description of a similar M/G/1 retrial queue. Then, it is shown that analogue results to those appeared in Sections 3 and 5 can be derived for this model. In particular, these results lead to a conjecture regarding the structure of the expected tangible externalities in the corresponding M/G/1 retrial queue.
Related literature
In general, this work is about a regulation of a system with shared resources by an implementation of a price function. The fact that systems with shared resources may become inefficient due to individualism is notably mentioned by [12] which was later reviewed by e.g., [7] . One sort of remedy for this problem is an implementation of a price function (a.k.a Pigouvian tax in economic literature). For more details in an introductory level from the point of view of social welfare theory, see Chapter 11 of [19] . In addition, some papers about regulation of economic systems with externalities by taxation are e.g., [2, 3, 4] .
In queueing literature, the issue of regulation of an observable queue goes back to [18] and [20] while regulation of an unobservable queue was primarily discussed by [8] . These papers initiated an academic discussion about decision-making in queueing systems which is surveyed by [14] and more recently by [13] . Clearly, the current model is flexible enough to model customers with heterogeneous preferences. For references of some works in this direction see e.g., Sections 2.5, 3.3, 3.4 of [14] . Especially, recently [21] 2 has extended the framework which was suggested by [23] in the following way: Assume a model with customers of different types who arrive into an unobservable single-server queue. The customers have a (homogeneous constant) linear loss by their waiting times and they have two decisions to make. First, they have to decide whether to join the queue. Secondly, once they join the queue, they have to decide how much service to require. Then, the author analyses two regulation mechanism: (1) a constant toll and (2) a toll which is determined uniquely by the service duration. Now, the major differences between the model of [21] and the current one are the followings:
1. Unlike the current work, in the model of [21] there exists strategic interaction between customers.
2.
In [21] , given the type of the customer, the utility of this customer from service is a deterministic concave function which has a smooth derivative and satisfies some additional assumptions such as monotonicity with respect to the type of the customer. On the contrary, in this work, it is possible that the type of every customer determines the distribution of the corresponding marginal utility process which is a stochastic and doesn't have to be smooth. In addition, unlike [21] , in this paper it can be assumed that the distribution of the type is general. Importantly, these differences imply that the solution methodology which is presented in this paper is different than the one suggested by [21] .
3. Unlike [21] , the loss rate from waiting time in this model is a random variable and hence it can be different between different types of customers.
4. Unlike [21] , this paper refers also for a retrial version of this model. [21] which is focused on showing a relation to tangible externalities, this work provides a practical answer to the question of how to compute the optimal price function.
Unlike
Another contribution of the current work is modelling the marginal utilities of customers in queueing systems by stochastic processes. While we believe that this is a new modelling technique in analysis of decision-making in queueing systems, it is not new in economics discipline (see e.g., [11] ). Another aspect of this work which appears in Section 4 is using Lévy processes to model the marginal marginal utilities of the customers. For other applications of Lévy processes in queueing systems, mostly as inputs processes of various storage systems, see e.g., [6] .
Model description
Assume that customers arrive into a service facility with a single server and an infinite waiting room according to a Poisson process with rate λ ∈ (0, ∞). In addition, the service discipline is non-preemptive, strong and work-conserving such that when a customer enters into a service position, she receives service which lasts until she decides to stop and then leaves the system for good. To model the preferences of the customers, let
be an iid sequence of random objects which is independent from the arrival process. In particular, C 1 is a nonnegative random variable with mean γ ∈ (0, ∞) and {V 1 (s); s ≥ 0} is a nonincreasing right-continuous stochastic process for which V 1 (0) is a nonnegative random variable with a finite second moment. For every i ≥ 1, the total utility of the i'th customer from waiting w ≥ 0 minutes (not including service time) and receiving a service of s ≥ 0 minutes equals to
where p : [0, ∞] → [−∞, ∞] is a general Borél function. This means that the i'th customer suffers a linear loss from waiting time with rate C i and has a stochastic marginal utility from service duration which is given by V i (·). In addition, for every s ∈ [0, ∞], p(s) is a deterministic price which has to be payed by a customer for occupying the server for s minutes and notice that conceptually negative as well as infinite payments are also allowed. Importantly, since customers neither have an option not to join the queue nor to abandon it, there is no strategic interaction between them and their decisions are not influenced by their waiting times. Now, to analyze the decision making of the customers, we assume that for every i, the i'th customer knows the statistical assumptions of the model. In addition, she observes the evolution of V i (·) from the moment she enters into a service position and until she leaves the system. Thus, if F V i is the natural filtration which is associated with V i (·), her objective is to solve the next optimal-stopping problem (which might not have a solution)
with the following additional assumption regarding the individual choice of the customers: If S ′ and S ′′ are two stopping times such that w (S ′ ) = w (S ′′ ), S ′ ≤ S ′′ , P -a.s. and P (S ′ < S ′′ ) > 0, then all customers consider S ′ as better than S ′′ . In particular, notice that the expectation which appears in the objective functional in (3) doesn't depend on i because V 1 (·), V 2 (·), . . . is an iid sequence of processes. Moreover, observe that once (3) has a solution, S i , since V 1 (·), V 2 (·), . . . is an iid sequence of processes which is independent from the arrival process, then so is the corresponding sequence of stopping times S 1 , S 2 , . . .. Thus, the resulting queue is a standard M/G/1 queue with a service distribution which is determined by the price function through the mechanism of the individual optimization posted by (3) . Now, we shall consider this system from a social point of view. The social objective is to optimize the performance of the system by an implementation of a price function. Namely, we are looking for a price function such that 1. There exists a solution for (3) (otherwise p(·) is not a good manipulator of individual behaviour).
2. The resulting M/G/1 queue is stable (otherwise the system is overflowed).
3. The expected total utility of a random customer in steady state of the resulting M/G/1 queue is maximized over the set of all price functions satisfying the criteria 1 and 2.
We solve this problem by the following two-stage approach: Stage 1 is to find a service distribution for which the expected total utility of a random customer in steady state is maximized over the set of all service distributions for which the system is stable. Notice that this stage involves an optimization over a domian of service distributions. Then, in Stage 2, we find a price function for which the individual optimization has a unique solution which is distributed like the solution of stage 1. This solution will be elaborated in Section 3.
The following paragraph includes some notations to be used later on. For every (a, b) ∈ R 2 let a ∧ b ≡ min{a, b}, a + ≡ max{a, 0} and a − ≡ (−a) + . In addition, (Ω, F, F, P ) is the filtered probability space which is in the background of this model. It is assumed that the filtration is right-continuous and augmented. In addition, X ∈ F means that X is F-measurable function. Furthermore, for every X ∈ F, once exists, EX is the expectation of X with respect to (w.r.t) P . Similarly, whenever exists, for every X ∈ F, the corresponding variance w.r.t P is denoted by Var(X). Finally, for sake of brevity, let V ≡ V 1 .
Optimal price function
Using well-known results regarding the virtual waiting time of M/G/1 system, the optimization over service distributions in stage 1 is given by:
The problem with this formulation is as follows:
then the objective functional is not well defined for S. To solve this technical problem we suggest to rephrase (4) as follows (Later, in Remark 7, an alternative reformulation of (4) is suggested):
For simplicity of notations, denote the objective functional and the optimization domain of (5) respectively by f (·) and S. Now, observe that
and hence
which means that the objective functional f (·) is well defined on the optimization domain S. We suggest to solve (5) by the following two phase method.
Phase I:
For every α ∈ 0, λ −1 and x ∈ R define
Now, for a given α ∈ 0, λ −1 , consider (5) with the additional constraint ES = α, i.e.,
We refer to this problem as the optimization of phase I with α. If α = 0, then it is straightforward that S 0 (∞) equals zero P -a.s. and hence it is a solution of Phase I with α = 0. Now, assume that α ∈ 0, λ −1 and observe
It is given that
Thus, by Theorem 1 of [16] (see also the last paragraph before Proposition 1 of the same reference) there exists
is a solution of (9).
Remark 1 Observe that S α (x) is nonincreasing with respect to both α and x on 0, λ −1 × R. In addition, ES α (x α ) = α for every α ∈ 0, λ −1 and hence x α is also nonincreasing w.r.t α. Since x 0 = ∞ ≥ 0, this implies that α ∈ 0, λ −1 ; x α ≥ 0 is not an empty set and hence it is an interval starting from zero and having right end-point
In addition, note that ES α (0) is nonincreasing function of α and hence α ′ can be derived by a bisection method on 0, λ −1 . This observation is practical when special cases like those presented in Section 4 are considered.
Remark 2 When V (0) is bounded by a positive constant κ, then for every
is a monotone function of x, then for every α for which x α ≥ 0, x α can be derived by a bisection method on [0, κ]. This is another practical observation which is applied in Section 4.
Phase II:
For every α ∈ 0, λ −1 , define
which is the value of the objective functional after phase I. The main results regarding phase II follow by the following consecutive lemmata. The main results are provided by Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
.
and notice thatS ≤ S α soα ≡ ES ≤ α. This implies that
Finally, notice that sinceα < α,α = ES = ESα and
then the same argument done in Remark 1 implies that xα is nonnegative and the result follows.
Proof: Let α ∈ 0, λ −1 such that x α ≥ 0 and notice that
Therefore, since V (·) is nonincreasing, deduce that
Then, use Lemma 1 in order to show that this upper bound holds for every α ∈ 0, λ −1 . Finally, to show that g(α) ≥ 0 for every α for which x α ≥ 0 observe that in such a case, g(α) is defined as an expectation of an integral with an integrand which is nonnegative on the integration domain.
Lemma 3 For every α ∈ 0, λ −1 , S α has a finite second moment.
Proof: Let α ∈ 0, λ −1 . If x α ≥ 0, then the result is a consequence of Lemma 2 and hence it is left to consider the case when x α ∈ (−∞, 0). To this end, defineṼ (s) = V (s) − x α , ∀s ≥ 0 and observe that for every S ∈ S such that ES = α,
This means that S α is also a solution of
In addition, note thatṼ (·) is right-continuous, nonincreasing process such thatṼ (0) = V (0) − x α is a positive random variable with a finite second moment. Consequently, the result follows by Lemma 2, since by definition
Note that for every S ∈ S such that ES 2 < ∞,
This identity is useful in order to prove the next Lemma.
and for every (S, α) ∈ D denote
Note that V (·) is nonincreasing and hence s →
Thus, since an expectation is a linear operator, then
is concave on D. Especially, notice that S is associated with a finite second moment and hence (23) was used in order to justify this equality. Now, by Lemma 3, infer that
and hence the result follows because g(·) equals to a supremum of a concave functional on a convex set which is not empty (take e.g., (α, α)).
which belongs to the domain of the supremum which appears in (27), i.e.,
Now, the expectation in the second term is finite and hence this term tends to zero as α ↓ 0. In addition, for every α
Thus, since EV (0) < ∞, dominated convergence implies that the first term in (28) tends to zero as α ↓ 0. To provide an upper bound which tends to zero note that for every α ∈ 0, λ −1
which is specified by Theorem 1 of [16] . In particular, notice that this optimization is well-defined due to (6) . In addition, note that existence of this solution is justified by the same kind of argument which was provided in order to justify that S α is a solution of (9). Now, let
and notice that
Therefore, the pre-conditions of Proposition 1 of [16] are satisfied, i.e.,
and the proof is completed.
Proposition 1 For every ǫ > 0, (5) has an ǫ-optimal solution.
Proof: Fix ǫ > 0 and observe that since g(·) is continuous and concave on [0, ∞), then (5) doesn't have an ǫ-optimal solution only when g(α) → ∞ as α ↑ λ. Thus, the result follows by Lemma 2 which states that g(·) is bounded.
has an optimal solution which be-
is continuous on 0, λ −1 deduce that in such circumstances (5) has an optimal solution.
Remark 3 Note that since g(·) is continuous and concave, then standard line-search methods can be applied in order to derive an optimal solution (or an ǫ-optimal solution when an optimal solution doesn't exist) for phase II. This with Remarks 1 and 2 lead to a conclusion saying that when V (0) is bounded, then an optimal solution (or ǫ-optimal solution when there is no optimal solution) for (5) can be derived efficiently. Some examples are provided in Section 4.
The following theorem presents a characterization of an optimal solution of (5) and the corresponding price function. Notice that it requires an assumption that (5) has an optimal solution. However, if (5) doesn't have a solution, then still the result of the following Theorem 1 can be rephrased for an ǫ-optimal solution of (5) and a corresponding ǫ-optimal price function.
Theorem 1 Assume that (5) has an optimal solution. Then,
solution of (5) which has a finite second moment.
2. An optimal price function is given by
, ∀s ≥ 0 .
Proof: 1 stems directly from the lemmata which have been proved in this section. To show 2, notice that when p * (·) is implemented, then the marginal price from service is given by
which is nondecreasing continuous function of s. Thus, since V (·) is nonincreasing and right-continuous, then the resulting individual optimization is to stop service at the first time that the marginal utility is less than or equals to the marginal price, i.e., service is terminated at
which is a stopping time with respect to F V i .
Remark 4
Note that x α * ≥ 0 and hence the optimal price function p * (·) which is specified by Theorem 1 is a nonnegative increasing function such that p(0) = 0.
Remark 5 Note that p * (·) plus a constant is also an optimal price function. To see this repeat the same argument which appears in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 6 Note that a regulator who knows the probabilistic setup of the model may implement p * (·) even when for every i, the evolution of V i (·) over time is a private information of the i'th customer. This is true because p * (·) is uniquely determined by parameters of the system.
Remark 7
Recall that (5) is a rephrased version of (4) which was introduced in order to solve a technical problem happening when ES 2 = E S 0 V (s)ds = ∞. An alternative solution for this technical problem is to assume that the social planner's problem is given by
Namely, this problem is like the original one (4) with an additional constraint ES 2 < ∞. Note that the interpretation of this additional constraint is a requirement for finite expected waiting time of a random customer in the steady-state of the resulting M/G/1 queue. Now, recall that Lemma 3 states that the optimal solution which is specified by Theorem 1 has a finite second moment. Therefore, one can deduce that S * which is defined in Theorem 1 is an optimal solution of (35).
Examples

A linear function with a random intercept
Let Θ be a nonnegative random variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 < ∞. It is given that Θ is bounded from above by a constant κ ∈ (0, ∞) and assume that V (s) = Θ−s for every s ≥ 0. In addition, for every α ∈ 0,
Especially, this identity is valid for x = 0 and hence, as explained in Remark 1, it is possible to use a bisection procedure in order to derive α ′ . Importantly, in practice we approximate α ′ from below and hence the resulting α ′ is smaller than λ −1 . Furthermore, since V (0) = Θ is bounded by κ, then given some α ≤ α ′ , it is possible to compute x α by a bisection method on [0, κ] (see Remark 2) using (37). Now, after explaining how to compute x α for every α ∈ [0, α ′ ], the next step is to show how to compute g(α). To this end, notice that
Thus, by (36) with an insertion of x = x α , deduce that
and
Finally, since g(·) is concave (see Lemma 4), then a line search procedure can be performed on the interval [0, α ′ ] in order to derive α * which corresponds to (at least) an ǫ-optimal solution.
A positive constant minus a subordinator
Let {J(s); s ≥ 0} be a subordinator, that is, a nondecreasing process with stationary and independent increments with respect to (Ω, F, F, P ) such that J(0) = 0, P -a.s. It is known that
c ≥ 0 and ν is the associated Lévy measure which satisfies (0,∞) (y ∧ 1) ν(dy) < ∞. In addition, denote
and assume that ρ ∈ (0, ∞). Now, let κ ∈ (0, ∞) be some constant and assume that V (s) = κ − J(s) for every s ≥ 0. In addition, for every α ∈ 0, λ −1 and s ≥ 0, define J α (s) ≡ J(s) + γλ 1−λα s which is a subordinator with a Lévy measure ν, parameter c α ≡ c + γq 1−qα and exponent η α (·). Then, given α ∈ 0, λ −1 and x ∈ [0, κ], observe that
To derive a formula that can be used in practice, it is well known (see e.g., Section 3.1 of [1] ) that
, ∀τ ≥ 0 .
By these equations, differentiating (44) w.r.t τ and taking τ ↓ 0 deduce that
Thus, by plugging this result into Equation 3.7 of [5] , deduce that
This formula especially holds for x = 0 and hence can be used by a bisection procedure in order to derive α ′ (see Remark 1) . Notice that just like we did in the previous example, we practically approximate α ′ from below and hence the resulting α ′ is smaller than λ −1 . In addition, since V (0) is obviously bounded by κ, for every α ∈ [0, α ′ ], this formula can be used by a bisection method on [0, κ] in order to derive x α (see Remark 2) . Then, it is left to explain how to compute g(α). To this end, let S α = S α (x α ) and notice that
can be derived by a similar fashion to (46). In addition, for every τ ≥ 0, the Kella-Whitt martingale (see Theorem 2 of [17] ) which is associated with J α (·) is given by 
Thus, by applying Doob's optional stopping theorem w.r.t S α ∧ s for some s > 0 and then taking s → ∞ using monotone and bounded convergence theorems, deduce that
Now, by differentiating both sides w.r.t τ , for every τ > 0 obtain
(51) Thus, by taking a limit τ ↓ 0 using monotone convergence with the help of l'Hopital's rule (twice) deduce that
Now, observe that this result can be plugged into the objective function of phase II, i.e.,
Finally, since g(·) is concave on [0, α ′ ], then we can derive α * which corresponds to (at least) an ǫ-optimal solution by a line search on [0, α ′ ]. Note that it has been shown that g(α) is phrased in terms of integrals with respect to U (·). Thus, the next subsubsections refer to two special cases of the current model for which more precise formulae can be derived.
Remark 8 Importantly, observe that (52) holds also if we put a general subordinator (with the corresponding exponent) instead of J α (and η α ). This fact will be used in the next examples.
A positive constant minus a Poisson process
Assume that J(·) is a Poisson process with rate q ∈ (0, ∞). Now, let α ∈ 0, λ −1 and for every j = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊κ − x⌋ let
and s ⌊κ−x⌋+1 ≡ 0. In particular, notice that
and for every s ≥ 0 define
Then, observe that for every x ∈ [0, κ] and s ∈ [0, ∞) \ s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s ⌊k−x⌋+1 we have that
Thus, In a similar fashion, for every α ∈ [0, α ′ ] and s ≥ 0
and hence Therefore, to evaluate the objective function of Phase II numerically, one may use (52) (see also Remark 8) which implies that
Now, observe that J(S α ) is a discrete random variable with support N ≡ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊κ − x α ⌋ + 1}. Thus, since J(·) maintains independent increments, then for every n ∈ N P [J(S α ) = n] = P [J(s n ) = n] (66)
Finally, note that J(s n ) ∼ Poi (qs n ) and J(s n ) − N (s n−1 ) ∼ Poi q 1−λα γλ . Therefore, all of these probabilities has closed form expressions and so are EJ(S α ) and EJ 2 (S α ).
A positive constant minus a CPP with exponential jumps
Assume that J(·) is a compound Poisson process (CPP) with rate q ∈ (0, ∞) and jumps which have exponential distribution with rate θ ∈ (0, ∞). Now, let α ∈ 0, λ −1 and notice that for every x ∈ [0, κ], Theorem 4.5 of [25] can be used to evaluate ES α (x). Then, α ′ and x α (for α ∈ [0, α ′ ] can be derived as explained in the previous examples. Once x α is derived we can use the same theorem to derive numerically ES α and ES 2 α . Then, by the memoryless property of the exponential distribution we know that J (S α ) is distributed like κ − x α − γλSα 1−λα plus an independent exponential random variable with rate θ. Therefore, deduce that
Then, g(α) can be evaluated numerically by (65) just like it was done in Subsubsection 4.2.1.
Internalization of externalities
In queueing systems, [15] suggested to measure the expected externalities of a customer with service demand of s ≥ 0 minutes in a M/G/1 with nonpreemptive, work-conserving and strong discipline by the following way: assume that the system is in a steady state and we tag certain customer with service demand which equals s ≥ 0. Then, compute the amount of time that others wait when the tagged customer receives her service demand minus their waiting time when the tagged customer requests no service at all. This difference is a random variable which is defined as the tangible externalities of a customer with service demand of s ≥ 0 units of time. Now, [21] considered a certain queueing system with a strategic interaction between customers and showed that the price which regulates the system internalizes the externalities when externalities are measured in the sense of [15] . The result of this section states that this phenomenon also takes place in the system which was described in Section 2. Specifically, the following Theorem 2 shows (under some regularity conditions) that it is possible to choose α * and x * = x α * (note that Theorem 1 didn't claim for uniqueness) such that for every s ≥ 0, p * (s) which is an optimal price function, equals to the expected externalities which are created by a customer having s minutes of service in a strong, non-preemptive and work-conserving M/G/1 system with service demands having the same distribution like S α * (x * ). The following Lemma will help us to prove this result which is stated by the following Theorem 2.
Lemma 6
Let v : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) be a nonincreasing right-continuous function and denote for every n ∈ N, define v n (s) ≡ v * g n (s), ∀s ≥ 0 such that
Then, 1. For every n ∈ N, v n (·) is a continuous, nonnegative and nonincreasing function on [0, ∞) such that 0 ≤ v n (0) ≤ v(0).
For every
Proof:
1. Let U be a random variable which is distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and for every n ∈ N denote U n ≡ U n . Now, fix n ∈ N and notice that v n (s) = Ev (s + U n ) , ∀s ≥ 0 .
Recall that v(·) is nonnegative and nonincreasing function and hence v n (·) also shares these properties. In addition, since U n is nonnegative, then v n (0) ≤ v(0). To show that v n (·) is continuous on [0, ∞), pick an arbitrary s ∈ [0, ∞) and let (s k ) ∞ k=1 be a sequence such that s k → s as k → ∞. Then, since v(·) is nonincreasing, then s − U n is P -a.s. a continuity point of v(·), i.e., P -a.s. we have that v (s k − U n ) → v (s − U n ) as k → ∞. In addition, 0 ≤ v (s k − U n ) ≤ v(0) < ∞ for every k ∈ N and hence dominated convergence theorem implies that
and the result follows.
2. Fix s ∈ [0, ∞) and observe that v(·) is nonnegative, nonincreasing and right-continuous. Thus, since U n ↓ 0, P -a.s. as n → ∞, then the result follows by monotone convergence theorem.
and let S ∈ S be such that P S 0 < S > 0 and define S ′ ≡ S ∧ S 0 . Observe that S ′ ≤ S, P -a.s., P (S ′ < S) > 0 and f (S) ≤ f (S ′ ). This implies that it is enough to look for a solution for (5) which is dominated by S 0 in that strict sense. Therefore, from now on, w.l.o.g we shall assume that V (·) is nonnegative because otherwise the optimization could be carried out with V + (·) instead of V (·) and the same results would be obtained.
Theorem 2 Assume that EV (0) γ < 1 and f (S * ) > 0. Then, there exists (α, x) ∈ 0, λ −1 ×[0, ∞), such that S ′ ≡ S α (x) is a solution of (5), ES ′ = α and
(74)
Remark 9
Observe that a substitution of (α * , x * ) which appears in the definition of p * (·) by (α, x) which are defined in the statement of Theorem 2 leads to the corresponding expression in Theorem 2.1 of [15] . Consequently, Theorem 2 guarantees existence of an optimal price function which internalizes the externalities of the system.
Remark 10
Observe that Theorem 2 doesn't state that p * (·) which is given by Theorem 1 necessarily internalizes the externalities of the system.
Proof: The proof of this theorem has two steps:
Step 1:
Assume that V (·) is a continuous process and observe that the pre-conditions of Theorem 1 hold because EV (0) γ < 1 (see Proposition 2) . Then, let S * , α * and x * be defined like in Theorem 1. In addition, It is given that α * > 0 and hence P [V (0) > x * ] > 0. Thus, given the event {V (0) > x * }, since V (·) is continuous, then V (S * ) = γλ 1 − λα * S * + x * . Therefore, by multiplying both sides by S * and taking expectations we have that
(75) Thus, by multiplying both sides by P [V (0) > x * ], deduce that
In addition, for every v > 0 we shall define a function
Now, V (·) is continuous on [0, ∞) and hence the fundamental theorem of calculus implies that for every v > 0
Observe that this derivative is nonnegative and dominated from above by S * V (0). Therefore, since S * is dominated by a linear function of V (0) (see Lemma 3) and EV 2 (0) < ∞, then by dominated convergence theorem we shall replace the order of expectation and differentiation, i.e., ω(·) is differentiable at some neighbourhood of v = 1 with a derivative
Clearly, from Theorem 1, deduce that v = 1 is a global maximum of ω(·). Therefore, applying this result with a first order condition at v = 1 and an insertion of (76) all together lead to a conclusion that
Note that f (S * ) > 0 implies that α * > 0 and hence the result follows.
Step 2:
In this step we prove the result for V (·) which is not necessarily continuous on [0, ∞). To this end, for every n ∈ N define V n (s) ≡ V * g n (s), ∀s ≥ 0 such that g n is given by the statement of Lemma 6. Note that due to this Lemma, for each n ∈ N, V n satisfies the assumptions of Step 1 of this proof. In addition, by the same Lemma, since it is known that for every s ≥ 0, V n (s) ↑ V (s) as n → ∞. Now, for every n ∈ N consider the optimization
and denote its objective functional by f n (·). In addition, since V n (0) ≤ V (0) and EV (0) γ < 1, then Proposition 2 implies that (77) has a solution S n which is specified by Theorem 1. In particular, for every n ∈ N let α n ≡ ES n and assume that x 1 , x 2 , . . . is a sequence of numbers such that
Clearly, the sequence ES 1 , ES 2 , . . . is bounded on 0, λ −1 . In addition, recall that for every n ∈ N, S n is bounded by a linear function of V n (0) which is bounded by V (0) (see also Lemma 3) . Therefore, since EV 2 (0) < ∞, the sequence ES 2 1 , ES 2 2 , . . . is bounded. Consequently, an application of Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem implies that there exists
Now, since for every k ∈ N, V n(k) (·) is a process which satisfies the assumptions of Step 1, we have that
Now, assume by contradiction that there exists {k l } ∞ l=1 ⊆ N such that α n(k l ) = 0 for every l ∈ N. This implies that S n(k l ) = 0, P -a.s. for every l ∈ N. Therefore, by optimality of S n(k l ) for each l ∈ N deduce that
Moreover, by Theorem 1, ES * < ∞ and hence we shall use (23) . Thus, since for every s ≥ 0, 0 ≤ V n(k l ) (s) ↑ V (s) as l → ∞, then monotone convergence implies that
and hence f (S * ) ≤ 0 which is a contradiction. This implies that there exists {k l } ∞ l=1 ⊆ N such that α n(k l ) > 0 for every l ∈ N and hence (79) implies that
Moreover, by construction, for every s ≥ 0, V n(k l ) (s) ↑ V (s) as l → ∞ and we also know that α n(k l ) → α as l → ∞. Therefore, if for every l ∈ N we define
and similarly
then for every s ≥ 0, H l (s) → H(s) as l → ∞. Now, for every l ∈ N define
Especially, observe that since H(·), H 1 (·), H 2 (·), . . . are all (strictly) increasing processes that tend to infinity as s → ∞, then H −1 (·), H −1 1 (·), H −1 2 (·), . . . are finite-valued continuous processes (with a time index u). Now, using exactly the same arguments which were made in the proof of Theorem 2A of [22] deduce that for every u ∈ R, H −1 l (u) → H −1 (u) as l → ∞. In particular, this is true for u = 0, i.e., for every sample-space realization
holds and the purpose now is to show that S ′ is a solution of (5). To this end, notice that for every l ∈ N, S n(k l ) is nonnegative and bounded from above by a linear function of V n (0) which is bounded by V (0) (see Lemma 3) . Therefore, by dominated convergence we have that
Now, for every l ∈ N, V n(k l ) (s) ≤ V (s), ∀s ≥ 0 and hence f n(k l ) (S) ≤ f (S), ∀S ∈ S. Thus, the optimality of S n(k l ) for each l ∈ N implies that
Moreover, by Theorem 1, it is known that ES * < ∞. Thus, since for every
Therefore, since Theorem 1 states also that ES 2 n(k l ) < ∞, ∀l ∈ N we shall use (23) . Then, by squeezing theorem deduce that
In particular, notice that for every l ∈ N, S n(k l ) is bounded from above by a linear function of V (0). Hence, for every l ∈ N, S n(k l ) 0 V (s)ds is bounded from above by a linear function of V 2 (0) which has a finite second moment. Thus, dominated convergence theorem justifies the third equality of (92) and the result follows.
A retrial version of the model
Consider the following model of a retrial queue which is similar to the model described in Section 2. Assume that customers arrive into a service facility with a single server, no waiting room and an infinite orbit capacity according to a Poisson process with rate λ ∈ (0, ∞). In addition, the retrial times are distributed exponentially with rate θ ∈ (0, ∞) and they are independent of all other random objects in this model. Another assumption is that the service discipline is non-preemptive and strong such that when a customer enters into a service position, she receives service which lasts until she decides to stop and then leaves the system for good. To model the preferences of the customers, let
be an iid sequence of random objects which is independent from the arrival process. In particular, C 1 and D 1 are nonnegative random variables with positive finite means EC 1 = γ and ED 1 = δ. Furthermore, we assume that {V 1 (s); s ≥ 0} is a process like described in Section 2. Now, for every i ≥ 1, the total utility of the i'th customer from waiting w ≥ 0 minutes (not including service time), performing r retrials and receiving a service of s ≥ 0 minutes equals to
where p : [0, ∞] → [−∞, ∞] is a general Borél function. This means that the i'th customer suffers a constant loss of r monetary units per each retrial, linear loss from waiting time with rate C i and she also has a stochastic marginal utility from service duration which is given by V i (·). Now, the purpose here is just like in Section 2, i.e., to find an optimal price function. To this end, using Equations (3.15) and (3.16) of [24] , the corresponding social optimization is given by
Especially, notice that just like in Section 3 the objective functional of (95) is not well defined for any random variable S for which ES 2 = E S 0 V (s)ds = ∞. Therefore, the problem can be rephrased as follows
and letf (·) be the objective functional of (97). Now, consider the same two-phase solution strategy which was used Section 3.
Phase I:
For every α ∈ 0, λ −1 the optimization of Phase I is and by the same arguments which were done in Section 3 deduce that there exists x α such that
is an optimal solution of (97). In addition, clearly, Remarks 1 and 2 are valid for this model too.
Phase II:
For every α ∈ 0, λ −1 denote the objective value of Phase II: Now, it is easy to check that the same kind of analysis which was performed in Subsection 3.2 implies similar result to this model too. Namely, Propositions 1 and Proposition 2 are valid in the current model. In addition, there is an analogue for Theorem 1 which is given by Theorem 3 Assume that (5) has an optimal solution. Then, 1. There exists α * ∈ 0, EV (0) γλ ∩ 0, λ −1 such thatS * ≡S α * (x * ) is an optimal solution of (97) which has a finite second moment.
2. An optimal price function is given bỹ p * (s) ≡ sx * + s 2 λ (γ + θδ) 2 (1 − λα * ) , ∀s ≥ 0 .
Moreover, we emphasize that the parameters ofp * (·) can be derived using standard techniques which were developed in Section 3 and illustrated in Section 4.
Conjecture about externalities in M/G/1 retrial queue
The purpose of this part is to discuss tangible externalities in M/G/1 retrial queue with no waiting room, infinite orbit capacity and exponential retrial times with a constant rate (for exact model setup see e.g., Sections 2 and 3 of [24] ). To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing results for expected externalities in this model. Practically, the first step towards such results is to derive an expression for x * in terms of α * and E S * 2 . Then, it is reasonable to expect thatp * (·) internalizes the tangible externalities just like p * (·) does in the case of the model presented in Section 2. Then, if this is true, an exact expression for the expected tangible externalities in such retrial model can be derived. Thus, this part includes a conjecture (without a proof) regarding the exact expression for the expected externalities in the current retrial queue. Importantly, notice that unlike the regular M/G/1 queue, in a retrial queue the externalities created by a tagged customer are decomposed into two parts: Now, v = 1 is a maximum point of ω(·). Moreover, by the same arguments presented in Step 1 of Theorem 2 deduce that ω(·) is differentiable at a neighbourhood of v = 1. Therefore, the corresponding first order condition with an insertion of (101) implies that
Note that the same technique which was used to generalize the result of step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2 can be used here as well in order to generalize this result to the case where V (·) is not necessarily continuous. Now, by an insertion of (102) into (100) deduce that when EV (0) γ < 1, then for every s ≥ 0p * (s) = λ (γ + θδ) z(s)
such that
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the mean waiting and tangible externalities which are caused due to an existence of a customer with service demand s ≥ 0 are given respectively by λz(s) and λθz(s). Since this is not the focus of this work, the proof of this conjecture is left for further research.
